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NOTICE OF MOTION 
 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiffs will move the Court, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), to grant preliminary approval of the proposed class action 
settlement entered into by the Parties, on Friday, August 23, 2013 at 9:00 a.m., or at such other 
time as may be set by the Court, at 280 South 1st Street, San Jose, California, Courtroom 4, 5th 
Floor, before the honorable Edward J. Davila. 
Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of this class action settlement, certification of the 
proposed Class, appointment of the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, and appointment of their 
counsel as Class Counsel. The Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the Brief in Support of 
the Motion attached hereto and the authorities cited therein, oral argument of counsel, and any 
other matter raised or submitted at the hearing, and all of the documents in the record. 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This proposed nationwide class action Settlement seeks to resolve two putative class 
actions filed against Google, Inc., the nation’s most popular Internet search engine. In each action, 
Plaintiffs allege Google divulged user search queries to third parties without user knowledge or 
consent.  
The non-reversionary Settlement was achieved through mediation, through arm’s-length 
negotiations over four separate days, and after three contested motions to dismiss and discovery. 
Additionally, the cash component of the Settlement—$8.5 million—is squarely within the range 
of similar class action settlements, including: In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv-672-
JW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010), Dkt. 41 ($8.5 million cy pres fund); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., 
5:11-cv-379-EJD (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013), Dkt. 256 ($9 million cy pres fund); and Lane v. 
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) ($9.5 million cy pres fund). In light of the minimal 
monetary recovery that would have been realistically recovered by individual Class Members and 
the immediate benefits offered to the Class by injunctive relief and cy pres donations, the 
Settlement is deserving of preliminary approval. 
In addition to the cash component, the proposed Settlement also requires Google to post 
disclosures on its website concerning user search queries. As a result of this Settlement, users will 
be given information about whether their search queries are transmitted to third parties and have 
the opportunity to make informed decisions about their privacy choices.  
In determining whether preliminary approval is warranted, the issue before the Court is 
whether the Settlement is within the range of what might be found to be fair, reasonable and 
adequate, so that notice of the Settlement should be given to Class Members, and a hearing 
scheduled to consider final approval. The Court is not required at this time to make a final 
determination as to the fairness of the Settlement. 
The parties here have made the showing necessary for preliminary approval. The 
Settlement was reached through serious, informed, non-collusive arm’s-length bargaining, creates 
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real benefits for the class, and is within the range of an acceptable settlement. Furthermore, the 
proposed notice to Class Members is more than adequate under the applicable standards. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs hereby move the Court for preliminary approval. 
II. LITIGATION HISTORY 
Plaintiff Paloma Gaos filed suit in October 2010 alleging that Google transmitted user 
search queries to third parties without knowledge or consent in order to enhance advertising 
revenue and profitability. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleged that Google’s practice violated the 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a), the Consumers Legal Remedies Act 
(“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq., the False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 17500, the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and Cal. 
Civ. Code §§ 1572 and 1573, and constituted unjust enrichment and public disclosure of private 
facts. (Dkt. 1.) 
Google moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court dismissed Plaintiff 
Gaos’s Complaint with leave to amend. In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Gaos alleged 
violations of the SCA, violations of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1572-73, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation, public disclosure of private facts, breach of contract, and, in the 
alternative, unjust enrichment. (Dkt. 26.) 
Upon Google’s Rule 12 Motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Gaos’s First 
Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff Italiano joined the Second Amended 
Complaint, and together, Plaintiffs alleged Google’s conduct violated the SCA and the UCL, and 
also constituted breach of contract, or, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. (Dkt. 39.) Google 
again moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, which the Court terminated as moot 
when it consolidated the Gaos and Priyev actions. (Dkt. 51.) Also, throughout the litigation, 
Plaintiffs propounded written discovery upon Google. (Exhibit 1, Aschenbrener Decl. ¶ 2.) 
From the beginning and while actively litigating, the Parties attempted to resolve the 
matter without further litigation, but did not find success until mediating with Randall Wulff. (Id. 
¶ 3.) First, counsel for the Parties met in person in San Francisco in January 2011 to discuss 
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possible resolution; the meeting was not successful. (Id. ¶ 4.) Counsel for the Parties met again in 
San Francisco in February 2011, but were again unsuccessful. (Id. ¶ 5.) Counsel for the Parties 
met a third time to discuss resolution in June 2012, this time for an all-day negotiating session, but 
were once again unsuccessful in coming to terms despite extensive post-meeting discussions 
throughout the summer of 2012. (Id. ¶ 6.) 
Plaintiff Gabriel Priyev filed a case, alleging claims inclusive of the conduct at issue in 
Gaos, in the Northern District of Illinois in February 2012. Priyev v. Google, Inc., No. 12-cv-1467 
(N.D. Ill.). Priyev’s allegations and causes of action related to Google’s sharing of search queries 
via referrer headers and, among other things, Google’s resulting breach of its own express contract 
terms related to Google’s Web History service. (Exhibit 2, Chorowsky Decl. ¶ 8). On March 6, 
2012 Plaintiff Priyev moved to certify the class as alleged in his Complaint. (Id. ¶ 3). On March 
23, 2012 the Parties agreed by motion to allow Google additional time to respond to the 
complaint. (Id. ¶ 4). Ultimately, Google moved to dismiss on April 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 5). On July 13, 
2012, Priyev moved to transfer. (Id. ¶ 6). On August 3, 2012 Priyev voluntarily amended his 
Complaint and on August 10, 2012 Priyev filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶ 7). On 
August 28, 2012 the Court in the Northern District of Illinois granted Priyev’s contested and fully 
briefed Motion to transfer and ordered his case transferred to the Northern District of California. 
(Id. ¶ 10). On December 18, 2013 Priyev’s case file was electronically transferred to the Northern 
District of California. (Id. ¶ 11.) On January 8, 2013 the Priyev action was officially transferred to 
the Northern District of California’s docket. (Id. ¶ 12.) 
In an effort to advance the putative class’s interests most efficiently and effectively, 
counsel for Plaintiffs Gaos and Italiano and for Plaintiff Priyev decided to work cooperatively to 
again attempt to resolve the matter. (Asch. Decl. ¶ 7.) On January 28, 2013, in Oakland, 
California, the Parties mediated the case before Randall Wulff, an experienced and well-respected 
mediator of class action disputes. (Id. ¶ 8.) The arms-length negotiation went all day and long into 
the night, and based upon his review of the facts and applicable law in this case, Mr. Wulff 
proposed a settlement amount in the form of a “mediator’s proposal” to the Parties, which the 
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Parties accepted and which formed material terms of the Settlement. (Id. ¶ 9.) Later that week, the 
parties began negotiating a settlement agreement. (Id. ¶ 10.) Over the span of nearly two months, 
the Parties exchanged numerous drafts of the agreement and related documents. (Id. ¶ 11.) On 
March 16, 2013, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit 3. (Id. 
¶ 12.) 
On April 26, 2013 the parties jointly stipulated and requested that this Court approve their 
Stipulation to consolidate the cases and filed a Proposed Consolidated Class Action Complaint, 
5:10-cv-04809 EJD, Dkt. No. 50, which counsel for the parties drafted in unison in light of the 
settlement of both cases. The Stipulation was granted on April 30, 2013. (Chor. Decl. ¶ 17). The 
Consolidated Complaint, now the operative Complaint in this matter, incorporates claims and 
allegations from both the Priyev and Gaos matters. (Id. ¶ 18.) 
At all times, Google has denied and continues to deny any wrongdoing act or violation of 
the law whatsoever. (Ex. 3 Recitals.) 
III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS 
The Parties seek preliminary Settlement approval. The terms of the Settlement are set forth 
in the Settlement Agreement and briefly summarized here as follows: 
1. Class Definition 
 
The Settlement Agreement provides for a single Settlement Class, defined as follows:  
 
“Class” means all Persons in the United States who submitted a search 
query to Google at any time during the period commencing on October 25, 
2006, up to and including the date of the Notice of Proposed Class Action 
Settlement pursuant to the Notice Plan. This term wholly encompasses, 
but is not limited to, the Classes set forth in Paragraph 72 of the Priyev 
Complaint and in Paragraphs 97, 98, and 99 of the Gaos Complaint, 
respectively. 
(Ex. 3 § 1.4.) 
2. Settlement Fund Payments 
Google has agreed to pay the total amount of eight million five hundred thousand dollars 
($8.5 million USD) in cash into a Settlement Fund—none of which will revert to Google under 
any circumstances—to be used for the payment of Settlement Administration Expenses, Cy Pres 
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distributions to the proposed Cy Pres Recipients, any Fee Award or costs awarded to Class 
Counsel, and any incentive awards awarded to the Class Representatives and named Plaintiffs in 
the Related Actions. (Ex. 3 § 3.2.) 
3. Injunctive or Prospective Relief 
Plaintiffs have maintained throughout the litigation and negotiations that any settlement 
would need to include injunctive relief designed to notify users as to Google’s conduct so that 
users can make informed choices about whether and how to use Google Search. (Asch. Decl. 
¶ 13.) The instant Settlement Agreement provides such relief. (Asch. Decl. ¶ 14.) 
Specifically,  
 
Google agrees to make certain Agreed-Upon Disclosures concerning 
search queries on or before the date of Notice of Proposed Class Action 
Settlement pursuant to the Notice Plan. These Agreed-Upon Disclosures 
will appear on Google’s “FAQs” webpage currently located at 
http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/faq/, “Key Terms” webpage 
currently located at http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/key-terms/, 
and the “Privacy FAQ for Google Web History” webpage currently 
located at https://support.google.com/accounts 
/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=54050, as further described in Exhibit A. 
If a subsequent change to Google’s services renders the Agreed-Upon 
Disclosures inaccurate, Google may make future changes to its disclosures 
to ensure continued accuracy. Likewise, Google may change the form or 
placement of the disclosures as part of future changes to its privacy 
policies, provided that the substance remains substantially the same and 
that it is incorporated into the applicable terms of service or privacy policy 
and is reasonably accessible to the user. 
(Ex. 3 § 3.1.) 
4. Cy Pres 
After payment of Settlement Administration Expenses, the Fee Award, and the collective 
Incentive Award, the balance of the Settlement Fund shall be distributed to Cy Pres Recipients 
selected by the Parties and approved by the Court.  
The Parties have, as of the time of this filing, agreed to propose the following entities as Cy 
Pres Recipients: World Privacy Forum, Carnegie-Mellon, Chicago-Kent College of Law Center 
for Information, Society, and Policy, Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
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University, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, MacArthur Foundation, and AARP, Inc. 
(Ex. 3 § 1.11.) 
As a condition to receiving the payment, each Cy Pres Recipient, including those 
mentioned above, must agree to devote the funds to promote public awareness and education, 
and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related to protecting privacy on the 
Internet. If any Cy Pres Recipient does not agree to these conditions, then its portion will be 
distributed pro rata to the other identified Recipients; if no Recipient agrees to the conditions, or if 
the Court so requires, the Parties shall meet and confer to identify other appropriate recipients. The 
Class Administrator shall make payments to the Cy Pres Recipients within sixty days after the 
Effective Date. (Ex. 3 § 3.3.) 
No later than fourteen (14) days before the Objection Deadline, Class Counsel will make 
public, via the Settlement Website and direct notice to the Cy Pres Recipients, any additional Cy 
Pres Recipients and the allocations of Cy Pres disbursements. (Asch. Decl. ¶ 15.) 
The Settlement Agreement creates a common fund of $8,500,000.00, from which, after 
deductions for any attorneys’ fees and expenses and costs of settlement administration as approved 
by the Court, money will be distributed to Cy Pres Recipients that will “promote public awareness 
and education, and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related to protecting 
privacy on the Internet.” (Ex. 3 § 3.3.) No portion of the Settlement Amount or interest thereon 
will revert to Google. (Ex. 3 § 3.4.) 
As a condition of the Settlement, Google shall deposit, in an interest-bearing bank account 
designated and controlled by the Class Administrator, in two installments, the total sum of 
$8,500,000.00, which is intended to inure to the benefit of the Class. (Ex. 3 § 3.2.) 
5. Other Relief 
In addition to the individual and injunctive relief described above, Google has agreed to 
provide the following relief: 
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a. Payment of Notice and Administration Fees 
The Settlement Agreement includes payment for all notice and administration costs, which 
will be paid out of the Settlement Fund. (Ex. 3 § 3.2.) 
b. Compensation for the Class Representatives 
Google has agreed to pay out of the Settlement Fund, subject to Court approval, incentive 
awards for each Class Representative up to five thousand dollars ($5,000 USD) each. (Ex. 3 
§ 10.2.) It is not a condition of this Settlement that any particular amount of incentive awards be 
approved. (Ex. 3 § 10.1.) 
c. Payment of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses 
Plaintiffs may apply to the Court seeking a reasonable proportion of the Settlement 
Amount as payment of any reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs (“Fee Award”). The Fee Award 
will be paid from the Settlement Fund. It is not a condition of this Settlement that any particular 
amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, or expenses be approved by the Court, or that such fees, costs, or 
expenses be approved at all. (Ex. 3 § 10.1.) Plaintiffs have not negotiated, and do not intend to 
negotiate, a clear sailing provision for Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs request. (Asch. Decl. 
¶ 16.) 
6. Release 
In exchange for the relief described herein, and upon entry of a Final Order approving this 
Settlement, Google will be released from “any and all claims that any Class Member may now or 
at any time have up to the date of preliminary approval of this Agreement, whether or not known 
or existing at the time of this Agreement, arising out of the subject matter giving rise to the claims 
in the Actions.” (Ex. 3 §§ 1.34, 9.1-9.3.) 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The law favors settlement. See, e.g., Churchill Village, LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 
576 (9th Cir. 2004). To grant preliminary approval, this Court need find only that the proposed 
Settlement falls within the range of possible final approval. The final approval hearing calls on the 
Court to consider several factors, including the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, 
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complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status 
through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of 
the proceedings, and the experience and views of counsel. Id. at 575. 
Generally, settlements are presumed fair and reasonable where the settlement was the 
product of non-collusive, arm’s length negotiations conducted by capable and experienced 
counsel. See, e.g., Netflix at 7. The proposed Settlement satisfies these requirements, and Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval and order that notice be issued to the 
Settlement Class. 
A. The Court Should Certify the Proposed Settlement Class 
The Court must determine that the proposed Settlement Class is proper for settlement 
purposes and thus appropriate for certification before granting preliminary approval of the 
settlement. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). Class certification is appropriate when the following elements 
are met: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
1. The Numerosity Requirement Is Satisfied 
“The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if ‘the class is so large that joinder of all 
members is impracticable.’” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). “Where 'the exact size of the class is unknown, but general 
knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.’” In 
re Abbott Labs. Norvir Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1689899, 6 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007) (quoting 
ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.3 (4th ed. 2002)). See 
also Von Collin v. County of Ventura, 189 F.R.D. 583, 590 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Generally, the 
numerosity requirement is satisfied when the class comprises more than forty members. Celano v. 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Here, the proposed Class consists of 
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over 100 million persons. (Exhibit 4, Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 18, 24.) Accordingly, the proposed Class 
is so numerous that joinder of all claims is impracticable. 
2. The Commonality Requirement Is Satisfied 
The second threshold to certification requires that “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 
2001). Commonality may be demonstrated when the claims of all class members “depend upon a 
common contention” and “even a single common question will do.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) (internal quotation omitted); see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 
1019 (“[t]he existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a 
common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class”). 
Commonality exists where, as here, a “lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that 
affects all of the putative class members.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868 (citing LaDuke v. Nelson, 
762 F.2d 1318, 1332 (9th Cir. 1985); 5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 
¶ 23.23[5][f] (3d ed. 1999)).  
The common contention must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide 
resolution, and that the “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to 
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Moreover, the 
permissive standard of commonality provides that “[w]here the circumstances of each particular 
class member vary but retain a common core of factual or legal issues with the rest of the class, 
commonality exists.” Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2008). 
In the instant case, all Members of the Class share common claims arising out of Google’s 
alleged system-wide practice and policy of unlawful storage and disclosure of their search queries. 
As Plaintiffs allege, Google uniformly divulges the search queries of Google Search users to third 
parties via referrer headers—affecting all Search users in the same way. Such allegations show 
that Plaintiffs and the proposed Settlement Class share common statutory claims under the SCA, 
as well as various state law claims, that likewise result in common and shared factual and legal 
questions, such as: 
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a. whether and to what extent Google has disclosed its users’ search queries to third 
parties, and whether the disclosure is ongoing; 
b. whether Google continues to use or store information that is part of Web History 
after users choose to delete, remove or no longer store with Google such 
information; 
c. whether Google’s conduct described herein violates Google’s Terms of Service, 
Privacy Policy, Web History policy and representations to Plaintiffs and the Class; 
d. whether Google’s conduct described herein violates the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702, et seq.; 
e. whether Google’s conduct described herein constitutes a breach of contract or 
implied contract; 
f. whether Google’s conduct breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing; 
g. whether Google is unjustly enriched as a result of its conduct described herein; and 
h. whether Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to injunctive and other 
equitable relief. 
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Wal-Mart, answering these legal 
questions would resolve the claims of all Class Members of the Class in one stroke. Wal-Mart, 
131 S. Ct. at 2551. Thus, considering the nature of the issues and facts that bind each class 
member together, the proposed settlement class satisfies the commonality requirement. 
3. The Typicality Requirement Is Satisfied 
Rule 23 next requires that the representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the 
putative class he or she seeks to represent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement 
ensures that “the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Wolin 
v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). The typicality 
requirement is met if the claims of each class member arise from the same course of conduct, and 
the defendant’s liability turns on similar legal arguments. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868. The 
typicality determination is similar to the commonality inquiry; however, typicality focuses on a 
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comparison of the named plaintiffs’ claims with those of the class. Id. at 868-69. Typicality is 
measured under a permissive standard and does not require that the representative’s claims be 
identical, but only that they are “reasonably co-extensive with [the claims] of absent class 
members. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 
Plaintiffs Paloma Gaos, Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 
are Google Search users. (Dkt. 50, Ex. A, ¶¶ 7-9.) Plaintiffs, like the putative Class Members, each 
conducted Google searches during the class period; and during this time Google disclosed their 
search queries to third-parties, which Plaintiffs allege was contrary to Google’s promises to its 
users and without their authorization, per Google’s standardized course of conduct. (Dkt. 50, Ex. 
A, ¶¶ 100-118.)  
Plaintiffs and the putative Class allege they were uniformly subjected to Google’s storage 
and disclosure of users’ search queries without user consent. Plaintiffs allege that such conduct 
violates both the SCA and state law, with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class as a whole. And such 
conduct would provide identical statutory damages to all Members of the proposed Class under 
the SCA. Plaintiffs’ representation of the Settlement Class is thus appropriate because they were 
subjected to the same alleged unlawful conduct flowing from that uniform conduct. As such, 
Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are typical of, if not identical to, those of the proposed Class, and thus 
meet Rule 23(a)(3)’s requirements for typicality. 
4. The Adequate Representation Requirement Is Satisfied 
The final Rule 23(a) prerequisite is that the proposed class representatives have and will 
continue to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To 
determine if representation is adequate, the Court must ask “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their 
counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs 
and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 
1020. 
Because the named Plaintiffs share the same interests of putative Class Members in 
seeking relief for the alleged misconduct, and have no conflicts with putative Members of the 
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Class, they are adequate Class Representatives. Plaintiffs’ interests are entirely representative of 
and consistent with the interests of the proposed Settlement Class; Plaintiffs have lodged 
representative claims for Google’s alleged unlawful storage and disclosure of their search queries 
to third parties. Also, Plaintiffs’ active participation throughout the litigation demonstrates that 
they have and will continue to protect the interests of the proposed Settlement Class. 
Further, proposed Class Counsel have regularly engaged in major complex litigation and 
have extensive experience in consumer class action lawsuits that are similar in size, scope, and 
complexity to the present case. (Asch. Decl. ¶ 17); see, e.g., In re Facebook Privacy Litig., No. 
5:10-cv-2389 (N.D. Cal.); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv-4680; Firm Resumes of Nassiri 
& Jung LLP (attached as Exhibit 5-A), Aschenbrener Law, P.C. (attached as Exhibit 1-A), and 
Progressive Law Group LLC (attached as Exhibit 2-A). Accordingly, both Plaintiffs and proposed 
Class Counsel have and will continue to adequately represent the interests of the proposed 
Settlement Class. 
5. The Proposed Settlement Class Meets Rule 23(b)(3)’s Requirements 
In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must also meet one of the 
three requirements of Rule 23(b) to certify the proposed Class. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 
Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). Class certification pursuant 
to Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “the questions of law and fact common to members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
mechanism is superior to the other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate and 
encouraged “whenever the actual interests of the parties can be served best by settling their 
differences in a single action.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. 
a. Common Questions of Law or Fact Predominate Over Individual Issues 
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed class[] [is] 
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. 
Predominance exists “[w]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they 
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can be resolved for all members of the proposed class in a single adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d 
at 1022. “In addressing the questions of law or fact common to the members, the Court looks at 
common factual link[s] between all class members and the defendants for which the law provides 
a remedy.” Abels v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2005).  
Here, common questions predominate because there are few, if any, individualized factual 
issues, and because the operative facts involve Google’s standardized conduct, which is uniformly 
applicable to the class as a whole. The primary factual issue concerns whether Google divulged 
the search queries of the proposed Class Members to third parties.  
The primary legal issues concern whether Google’s disclosures were unlawful—e.g., 
whether Google’s alleged misconduct gives rise to liability under the SCA or breached its 
promises or duty of good faith and fair dealing to its users.  
Here too, the contractual writings at issue giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of 
contract, duty of good faith and fair dealing, and authorization to disclose search queries 
consistent with the SCA are applicable to the Class as a whole and the interpretation of these 
writings predominate. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1639 (when a contract is reduced to writing, the 
intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible); Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 1638 (the “language of a contract is to govern its interpretation”). See also Menagerie Prods. v. 
Citysearch, No. CV 08-4263 CAS (FMO), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108768, at *36 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
9, 2009) (certification of breach of contract claim where the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 
“arises from a standard form contract prepared by [defendant] to which all advertisers in the class 
agreed.”). 
These issues can be resolved for all Members of the proposed Class in a single 
adjudication. These common questions predominate because, in each case, “[t]he challenged 
practice is a standardized one applied on a routine basis to all [Google users].” Gutierrez v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2008 WL 4279550, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). Thus, the alleged 
wrongdoing predominates over any individual issues. 
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b. Class Treatment of These Claims Is a Superior Method of Adjudication 
A class action must be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “A class action is the superior method 
for managing litigation if no realistic alternative exists.” Reynoso v. South County Concepts, 2007 
WL 4592119, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007) (quotations omitted). In addition, a class action is 
superior where, as here, classwide litigation of common issues “reduces litigation costs and 
promotes greater efficiency.”  Orvis v. Spokane County, 281 F.R.D. 469, 475 (E.D. Wash. 2012) 
(citation, quotations omitted). 
In this matter, there is no realistic alternative to a class action, in large part because the 
proposed Class consists of tens of millions of Members. Moreover, most Members would find the 
cost of litigating individual claims to be prohibitive, and our court system could not handle 
millions of additional cases. Also, because the action will now settle, the Court need not consider 
issues of manageability relating to trial. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (citation omitted) 
(“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire 
whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is that 
there would be no trial.”) Accordingly, common questions predominate and a class action is the 
superior method of adjudicating this controversy. 
The following matters may also be considered: “(A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of 
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. These factors favor 
certification. First, because Google’s conduct affected the Class as a whole and was not directed at 
particular Members of the Class, and because affected consumers similarly used Google’s search 
functionality, no single Class Member has an interest in controlling the prosecution of the 
litigation. Second, other than the consolidated actions, Plaintiffs are aware of no other pending 
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litigation involving the controversy. Third, the Class is dispersed throughout the country, and it is 
desirable that litigation of the claims involved be concentrated in a single forum.  
B. The Proposed Settlement Is Fundamentally Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate, and 
Falls Well Within the Range of Preliminary Approval 
After certifying the proposed Class for the purpose of settlement, the Court should 
preliminarily approve the Settlement. The procedure for review of a proposed class action 
settlement is a well-established two-step process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see also ALBA CONTE & 
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 11.25, at 3839 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.41 (3d ed. 1995) In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 
1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). The purpose of this hearing is not to determine the ultimate fairness of 
the Settlement; instead, its purpose is to determine whether there is any reason to notify the 
putative Class Members of the proposed Settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing. In re 
Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Notice of a settlement 
should be sent out where “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, 
non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential 
treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible 
approval.” (Id., quoting NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25 (3d ed. 1992)). 
The Manual for Complex Litigation characterizes the preliminary approval stage as an 
“initial evaluation” of the fairness of the proposed settlement made by a court on the basis of 
written submissions and informal presentation from the settling parties. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004). If the court finds a settlement proposal “within the range of 
possible approval,” it then proceeds to the second step in the review process, which is the final 
approval hearing. NEWBERG, § 11.25, at 3939. 
Judicial policy strongly favors voluntary conciliation and settlement of complex class 
action litigation. In re Syncor, 516 F.3d at 1101 (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982)). While the district court has discretion regarding the approval of a 
proposed settlement, it should give “proper deference to the private consensual decision of the 
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parties.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. In fact, when a settlement is negotiated at arm’s length by 
experienced counsel, there is a presumption that it is fair and reasonable. In re Pac. Enters. Sec. 
Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, a settlement negotiated with the assistance of an 
experienced private mediator is further proof that the settlement was reached fairly and provides 
adequate relief. In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC, No. 00-cv-6689, 2003 WL 22244676, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003). Ultimately, though, the court’s role is to ensure that the settlement is 
fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); In re Syncor, 516 F.3d at 
1100. 
In this case, the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, especially in light of the 
uncertainties detailed below. Under this Settlement, Google will properly notify its users about its 
search query disclosure practices and pay millions of dollars to recipients that will provide the 
Settlement Class Members—and the public at large—with privacy protection, education, and 
services. (Exhibit 3 § 3.3.) Not only is the Settlement adequate on its own terms, but it compares 
favorably with the recoveries in similar nationwide privacy class actions reached against 
Facebook, Google, and Netflix. 
1. A Number of Uncertainties Inherent in this Litigation Make the Settlement the 
Best Recovery Attainable by the Settlement Class 
Given the substantial relief obtained for the Class, and the uncertainties that would 
accompany continued litigation, there is little question that the proposed Settlement is at least 
“within the range of possible approval.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
Congress enacted the SCA as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 and 2701-12. Section 2702(a) of the SCA prohibits companies that provide 
electronic communications services and remote computing services from divulging the contents of 
its users’ communications without user consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
Plaintiffs allege that Google is liable under the SCA, and Google denies this. Plaintiffs 
allege that under the SCA, Google is liable to all aggrieved persons for “the sum of the actual 
damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, 
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but in no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000. If the violation 
is willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action 
to enforce liability under this section, the court may assess the costs of the action, together with 
reasonable attorney fees determined by the court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c). 
Google also denies liability for any of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Upon Google’s Motions 
to dismiss, Plaintiff Gaos’ state law claims were dismissed (with leave to amend). (Dkt. Nos. 24, 
38.) The likelihood of success of Plaintiffs’ state law claims is uncertain. 
Although Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel are confident in the strength of their 
claims and in their ability to prevail ultimately at trial, they recognize that litigation is inherently 
risky. (Asch. Decl. ¶ 19.) If the litigation were to proceed, Google would raise multiple defenses, 
including express defenses under the SCA, making this Settlement all the more reasonable. 
Plaintiffs also anticipate that even if they win at trial that Google would have a strong 
argument that awarding full statutory damages—likely trillions of dollars—far in excess of the 
value of the company would trigger constitutional Due Process concerns, thus requiring remittitur. 
Plaintiffs believe they would be more likely than not to succeed on the merits and that even with 
the possibility of remittitur, they would come away with a significant judgment that could be 
enforced. Nevertheless, the viability of Google’s factual and legal defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims, 
many of which would create issues of first impression within this Circuit counsels in favor of the 
instant settlement. (Id. ¶ 20.) 
In light of the uncertainty inherent in this litigation and the time value of money, the 
Settlement Agreement represents a significant recovery under the circumstances for the proposed 
Class. 
2. The Cy Pres Donations Are the Best Means of Providing a Monetary Benefit to 
the Class 
Cy pres distribution is a distribution for the indirect prospective benefit of a class. 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:17 (4th ed. 2002.) The Settlement’s Cy Pres distribution will 
give the Class the greatest benefit of any form of monetary relief that could have been realized 
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here. Given the size of the Settlement Class, any realistically obtainable monetary award would 
result in payments to Class Members that would be negligible on an individual level. (Asch. Decl. 
¶ 21.) But under the terms of the instant Settlement, the Settlement Class will benefit from 
millions of dollars in donations to qualified organizations that promote public awareness and 
education, and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related to protecting privacy 
on the Internet. (Ex. 3 § 3.3.) The donations to these organizations will benefit the Class by aiding 
consumers in protecting themselves and their privacy online in the future. Id.  
Further, the substantial cy pres donations compare favorably to settlements in other 
Internet consumer privacy cases. See, e.g. In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. 5-10-cv-672-JW 
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (unauthorized disclosure of email contact lists; $8.5 million settlement 
fund with cy pres payments); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (unauthorized 
disclosure of personal information; cy pres distribution of $9.5 million); and In re Netflix Privacy 
Litig., No. 5:11-cv-379-EJD (Dkt. Nos. 80, 256) (unauthorized storage of personal information; cy 
pres distribution of $9 million). 
Because of the sheer size of the Class, it would be burdensome and inefficient at best to 
pay directly to the Class the cy pres funds that remain after costs directly because each Class 
Member’s recovery under a direct distribution would be, at best, de minimis. Lane, 696 F.3d at 
824-25. And even if there was some positive amount that could be paid directly to Class Members, 
it would likely prove to be nullified by distribution costs. Id. at 825. Unlike Lane, which 
essentially returned the cy pres funds back to the defendant for the purpose of having the 
defendant set up a privacy-related organization, the present agreement provides for distribution to 
already existing third-party organizations. The list of Cy Pres Recipient organizations includes 
leading consumer and privacy advocacy groups and academic institutions. The organizations are 
located throughout the country so as to best benefit the far-reaching Class in order to promote 
public awareness and education, and/or support research, development, and initiatives, related to 
protecting privacy on the Internet. (Exhibit 3 § 3.3.)  
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In light of the uncertainties of litigation, the minimal monetary recovery that would be 
realistically recoverable by individual Settlement Class Members even if they obtained a judgment 
on the merits, and the immediate benefits offered to the Class by the proposed Settlement, the 
Settlement Agreement offers the Class the greatest relief possible, and thus is deserving of 
preliminary approval. 
C. The Court Should Approve the Proposed Plan for Class Notice 
To satisfy the requirements of both Rule 23 and Due Process, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides 
that, “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best 
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
“The means (of notice) employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional 
validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain 
to inform those affected.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
“This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in 
another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate 
warning.” 
Here, the proposed Class likely numbers over one hundred million, making any form of 
direct notice impracticable. Indeed, courts have interpreted Rule 23 and Mullane so as not to 
require any form of direct notice—explicitly not requiring email notice—in much smaller cases 
(with millions of class members): 
 
The best practicable notice under the circumstance is notice by 
publication in newspapers. In view of the millions of members of 
the class, notice to class members by individual postal mail, email or 
radio or television advertisements, is neither necessary nor 
appropriate. The publication notice ordered is appropriate and 
sufficient in the circumstances. The timeline for notice provides 
reasonable, appropriate and ample opportunity for class members to 
oppose the settlement if they wish to do so. 
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In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 262 F.R.D. 205, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Plaintiffs propose a 
comprehensive Internet publication notice plan that is designed expressly “to inform those 
affected.” Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 at 315.  
As in MetLife, the best practicable notice given the enormous class size here is publication 
notice. The proposed notice plan in this case goes several steps beyond the approved notice plan in 
MetLife, though. Rather than notifying the Class of the Settlement through mere newspaper 
publication, Plaintiffs propose a comprehensive Internet Notice Plan designed to notify at least 
70% of the Class more than two times each. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 43.) Additionally, the proposed 
plan is designed to reach over 90% of security conscious Internet users more than two times 
each. (Id. ¶ 37.) This plan meets or exceeds the requirements of due process and the guidelines set 
forth by the Federal Judicial Center. And because the proposed notice plan uses the Internet as its 
medium, the plan’s implementation can be measured in real-time and adjustments to the 
placements can be made to meet its goals. (Id. FN 8.) As a result, this plan is more than 
“reasonably certain to inform those affected” because all Class Members are by definition, Internet 
users, and in fact search for content online. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Thus, the proposed Notice 
Plan is appropriate for this specific Class. 
In this case, the Class Administrator will be allocated up to $1 million out of the 
Settlement Amount to implement the following Notice Plan. (Ex. 3 § 5.1.) 
Settlement Website. The Settlement Administrator shall create and maintain a Settlement 
Website until at least thirty days after Effective Date of the Settlement, which is roughly sixty 
days after the Court enters an order granting final approval of the Settlement. The Settlement 
Website shall (i) post, without limitation, the operative Complaint(s), this Settlement Agreement, 
and Long Form Notice and Opt-Out Form; (ii) notify Class Members of their rights to object or 
opt out; (iii) inform Class Members that they should monitor the Settlement Website for 
developments; and (iv) notify Class Members that no further notice will be provided to them once 
the Court enters the Final Order and Judgment, other than through updates on the Settlement 
Website. The Class Administrator will establish an email account and P.O. Box to which Class 
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Members may submit questions regarding the Settlement. The Class Administrator will monitor 
the email account and P.O. Box and respond promptly to administrative inquiries from Class 
Members and may direct substantive inquiries to Class Counsel. (Ex. 3 § 5.5.) 
The Settlement Website will go live within thirty days of the entry of an order granting 
preliminary approval. (Ex. 3 § 5.4.) 
Publication Notice. The Parties shall also implement a comprehensive publication plan 
that conforms to all applicable rules and guidelines. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 20.) More specifically, the 
plan is projected to include more than 200 million impressions of online advertisements linking to 
the Settlement Website, including more than 70 million displays on Facebook and more than 130 
million displays on the 2000 most trafficked websites on the Internet. As a result, over 70% of the 
proposed Class will see the advertisements an average of 2.2 times. (Exhibit 4-C.)  
The Notice Plan will be established and publication will begin within thirty days of the 
entry of an order by the Court granting preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement. (Ex. 3 
§ 5.4.) All costs associated with implementing the Notice Plan, including the fees and costs of the 
Class Administrator, will be paid out of the Settlement Fund. Within ten days after the filing of 
this Agreement with the Court, Google will have the Class Administrator notify the appropriate 
state and federal officials of this Agreement pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 
U.S.C. § 1715. (Ex. 3 § 5.6.) 
The Settlement Website and publication plan represent a cross section of media 
specifically chosen by the parties to target likely Class Members and attain the widest reach 
possible. (Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 25, 31.) The format and language of each form of notice has been 
drafted so that it is in plain language, is easy to read, and will be readily understood by the 
Members of the proposed Class, thus satisfying the requirements of Rule 23 and Due Process. (Id. 
¶ 42.)  
Under the circumstances of this case, the proposed Notice Plan constitutes the best notice 
practicable. (Id. ¶ 53.) 
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V. PROPOSED SCHEDULE 
In connection with preliminary approval of the Settlement, the Court must set dates for a 
final fairness hearing, for mailing the Notice, for Class Members to object to the Settlement, for 
Class Members to exclude themselves from the Class, and for briefing related to the final approval 
of the Settlement and for Class Counsel to submit its motion for attorneys’ fees and 
reimbursement of expenses. Class Counsel propose the following schedule: 
 
Event Timing 
Deadline for Class Administrator to 
implement the Notice Plan, including 
the Settlement Website and the 
Publication Plan 
 
Within thirty (30) days of entry of 
the Preliminary Approval Order 
Deadline for Plaintiffs to Publish Final 
Cy Pres Distribution 
Within sixty (60) days of entry of the 
Preliminary Approval Order 
Deadline to submit Requests for 
Exclusion (the “Opt-Out Deadline”) 
 
Within ninety (90) days of entry of 
the Preliminary Approval Order 
Deadline for Class Administrator to 
provide the Parties with a list of all 
Persons who opted out by validly 
requesting exclusion 
 
Within ten (10) calendar days after 
the Opt-Out Deadline 
Deadline to apply for an award of 
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 
 
Not later than thirty-five (35) 
calendar days before the Final 
Approval Hearing 
Deadline to submit objections to the 
Settlement 
 
Not later than twenty-one (21) 
calendar days before the Final 
Approval Hearing 
Deadline to respond to any objections 
to the Settlement or Attorneys’ Fees 
and Costs and to submit briefing in 
support of final approval of the 
Settlement 
 
Not later than seven (7) days before 
the Final Approval Hearing 
Final Approval Hearing Not less than one hundred twenty 
(120) calendar days after entry of the 
Preliminary Approval Order 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully ask that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement, certify the Settlement Class, 
appoint, Paloma Gaos, Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev as Class Representatives, appoint 
Kassra P. Nassiri of Nassiri & Jung LLP, Michael Aschenbrener of Aschenbrener Law, P.C., and 
Ilan Chorowsky of Progressive Law Group LLC as Class Counsel, approve the form and manner 
of Notice described above, and award such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable 
and just.  
  
Dated: July 19, 2013 ASCHENBRENER LAW, P.C. 
 
 
s/ Michael J. Aschenbrener   
Michael J. Aschenbrener 
 
KASSRA P. NASSIRI (215405) 
(knassiri@nassiri-jung.com) 
NASSIRI & JUNG LLP 
47 Kearny Street, Suite 700 
San Francisco, California 94108 
Telephone: (415) 762-3100 
Facsimile: (415) 534-3200 
 
 
MICHAEL J. ASCHENBRENER 
(mja@aschenbrenerlaw.com) (277114) 
ASCHENBRENER LAW, P.C. 
795 Folsom Street, First Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94107 
Telephone: (415) 813-6245 
Facsimile: (415) 813-6246 
 
 
ILAN CHOROWSKY 
(ilan@progressivelaw.com) 
PROGRESSIVE LAW GROUP, LLC 
1 N LaSalle Street, Suite 2255 
Chicago, IL 60602 
Tel: (312) 787-2717 
Fax: (888) 574-9038 
 
 
  
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND THE 
PROPOSED PUTATIVE CLASS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that, on July 19, 2013, he caused this document to be 
electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send 
notification of filing to counsel of record for each party. 
 
Dated: July 19, 2013     ASCHENBRENER LAW, P.C. 
 
        
By: s/ Michael Aschenbrener   
       Michael Aschenbrener 
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